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Abstract—The present paper introduces a practical pro-
tocol for provably secure, outsourced computation. Our
protocol minimizes overhead for verification by requiring
solutions to withstand an interactive game between a
prover and challenger. For optimization problems, the best
or nearly best of all submitted solutions is expected to
be accepted by this approach. Financial incentives and
deposits are used in order to overcome the problem of
fake participants.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the classical Byzantine General’s Problem [9], three
parties try to agree on whether to “attack” or “retreat” by
passing messages back and forth. Here neither “attack”
nor “retreat” represents a semantic truth. The generals
simply want to agree on one plan or the other, and
neither plan is de jure more correct than the other.
In other consensus situations, such as those involving
mathematics, a true answer may in fact exist. A simple
way a group may achieve agreement about a known
computational problem is for each party to compute
the solution locally. With local computation, the com-
munication cost between parties is zero and therefore
beats any Byzantine consensus protocol in terms of the
number of messages sent. In practice, however, this local
computational approach may not be feasible due to its
heavy computational burden.
A machine with limited resources may wish to out-
source a computational problem to an external system.
Today cloud services exist which provide outsourcing
service to businesses and individuals. These services
generally require the individual to trust the cloud which
may or may not behave correctly for any reason, includ-
ing hardware failures or server cheating in order to save
computational resources.
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One promising approach to ensuring a correct answer
from an outsourced computation involves forcing the
cloud to provide a short proof which witnesses the cor-
rectness of his computation. Researchers have achieved
much progress on this method in recent years [17],
however the cryptographic setup costs and computational
overhead for state-of-the-art systems make these methods
impractical for many applications. We take a different
approach. In Section V-A, we contrast our approach with
this probabilistically checkable proof method.
Let us assume that the individual who wants to out-
source his computation offers to pay for a correct answer.
Suppose that a peer-to-peer distributed system of rational
servers exist who want to solve computational problems
in exchange for monetary rewards. In this paper, we show
how to harness the power of economics and consensus
in order to incentivize correct computation from such a
network with minimal overhead costs.
A. The Verifier’s Dilemma
The Bitcoin network provides evidence that systems
can economically incentivize correct computation. Bit-
coin miners correctly solve cryptographic hashing prob-
lems in exchange for monetary rewards in the form of
electronic currency. The scope of problems correctly
computed on Bitcoin does not, however, extend be-
yond “inverting” SHA2 hashes. The new cryptocurrency
Ethereum [4], which runs essentially the same consensus
protocol as Bitcoin, permits one to achieve an outsourced
computation protocol through a series of transactions
[12]. Anyone can publicly offer a reward for a puzzle,
and the first person to announce a correct solution gets
the reward.
Under the assumption that Ethereum miners are ratio-
nal, the Ethereum network may not correctly distribute
rewards for solutions whose verification requires more
than minimal computational work [12]. As in the pro-
tocol for Bitcoin, the Ethereum protocol dictates that
every miner should check every transaction that appears
on the cryptocurrency’s blockchain, or public ledger.
While Ethereum miners receive rewards for being the
first to solve mining puzzles, they do not receive rewards
for checking transactions. Thus miners may skip heavy
transactions which take a long time to verify in order
to get ahead in the mining race. But whether a rational
miner, who is trying to maximize his mining rewards,
benefits from verification depends on whether other min-
ers are honestly verifying, building on top of the current
blockchain without verifying, or backtracking along the
blockchain and extending with a block that doesn’t
include the heavy transaction. When a heavy transaction
appears on the blockchain, a rational miner doesn’t know
whether to verify it or not. This conundrum is known
as the Verifier’s Dilemma [12], and Ethereum’s gas
limit system does not entirely mitigate this problem.
As a result of the Verifier’s Dilemma, the Ethereum
blockchain may contain unverified transactions. An ex-
ample of a heavy transaction would be a solution to
an outsourced computational puzzle which take a long
time to verify. Thus, even though the Ethereum proto-
col achieves consensus on the blockchain, it may not
achieve consensus on the correct blockchain. In par-
ticular, assuming rational miners, Ethereum’s consensus
computer, or consensus-based outsourced computation
system, yields incorrect results.
B. Contribution of this paper
We describe a modification to the Ethereum consen-
sus protocol which incentivizes against the Verifier’s
Dilemma described above. Under the assumption that
computational entities on the network are both:
• non-lazy in the sense that one can convince them to
perform computations for the right price and
• rational in the sense that they will try to maximize
their individual payoffs from participation,
then our modified Ethereum system yields correct results
for any feasible function.
In the following discussion, a prover who provides
a solution to a puzzle must withstand challenges from
other parties on the network. These challenges result in
an authenticated, public transcript of interaction between
the prover and challenger which may be communi-
cated on the Ethereum blockchain or through some
other means. We assume throughout this paper that
the Ethereum smart contract mechanism can effectively
enforce the intended penalty and reward consequences
of such transcripts. The network identifies each party in
the protocol by its Ethereum wallet address.
We remark that the Verifier’s Dilemma may extend
to other cryptocurrencies besides Ethereum, such as
Bitcoin, when the number of transactions included be-
comes large enough that verifying all of them requires
significant computational effort. One can also use the
verification game presented in this paper to counteract
the Verifier’s Dilemma in Bitcoin by appropriate modifi-
cation to the Bitcoin protocol. Assuming a modification
to the Bitcoin in which miners can challenge blocks
with wrong transactions, either by posting “challenge”
transactions or through some other means and with
appropriate rewards for finding errors and penalties for
false alarms, one can achieve not only consensus on the
Bitcoin blockchain but, in fact, correct consensus.
C. Incentives from cryptocurrencies
Luu, Teutsch, Kulkarni and Saxena [12] proposed to
use cryptocurrencies, in particular Ethereum, for out-
sourcing computations. The network verifies outsourced
computations, either deterministically or in a statistical
way. The current work improves on this by using a
stricter verification protocol by using a verification game
between a prover and a challenger in order to check a
proposed solution to a computation task. The role of the
network then becomes to verify that the players (prover
and challenger) stick to the rules of the verification game.
Provers and challengers have to pay deposits in order to
participate. These deposits are refunded if the players
are honest; however, the deposits of dishonest provers
and verifiers are distributed in order to compensate the
honest participants of a verification game for their effort
and the task giver for the additional waiting time.
Under the assumption that at least one participant of
the pool of provers is honest and takes the effort to push
his solution through, the proposed framework leads to
the acceptance of a correct solution at the end. In the
case that no one solves the problem, but at least one
challenger is honest and invests the time to challenge
the wrong solutions, no solution is accepted by the
framework and the task giver receives back the offered
prize money. This model resembles the situation of grand
problems in mathematics such as the seven millennium
problems [7], where one million dollar prize money has
been offered for seven important mathematical problems
to be solved and the main effort of checking the solutions
was shifted to the mathematical community.
Consider the case that only a few places in the world
own supercomputers — such as Quantum computers —
and someone without direct access to these computers
wants to solve a difficult problem, say factorizing a large
integer. He could then outsource the computation and
the verification to such a network. This example also
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shows why one should permit challengers who need
not contribute a solution: some owners of traditional
supercomputers might not be able to factorize, but are
still able to run the algorithm of Agrawal, Kayal and
Saxena [1] to check whether all factors in a proposed
solutions are prime.
D. Systems that outsource computation
Humans today process more information than they
ever have in the past. One typically associates sci-
entific data processing with “supercomputers,” but
even your average consumer invokes computationally-
intensive processes every time they do a search query
on Google, receive news feeds on Facebook, or ask
Mathematica to compute Gro¨bner bases. The utility of
mobile devices derives not only from their connectivity
to the Internet but also from their connection to more
powerful machines.
Cloud computing offers a simple way to outsource
computation. A user who wants to compute something
submits a query to the cloud in the form of a program
and then waits for the cloud’s answer. In this model,
the user must trust that the machine hardware, software,
and administrator all function the way she expects them
to. In some situations, one or more of these may not
be reasonable assumptions. Hardware failures occur,
software bugs abound, and what’s to stop a dishonest
cloud that wants to save CPU cycles from spewing a
random answer when he knows that the user can’t tell
the difference from a real one?
Due to the possibility of such errors, one might ask the
cloud, in addition to providing the desired computation
to also provide a proof of its correctness. Several re-
cent papers, including [16], follow this approach. Since
reading a complete proof of correctness might take as
much time as simply doing the calculation oneself, the
authors employ the machinery of interactive proofs [11]
so that users need not read the entire proof but only
sample a few bits to confirm its correctness. Although
constructions have drastically improved efficiency in
recent years [17], general-purpose methods at the time of
this writing still carry impractically high computational
overheads for the cloud server.
E. Our approach
The approach to outsourced computation described
herein achieves provably correct computation through
financial incentives rather than proof systems. We de-
scribe a distributed system in which anyone connected
to the network can offer a reward for a puzzle, and
anyone connected to the network may obtain that reward
in exchange for a correct solution to the puzzle. In
order to maximize speed and minimize redundant work,
we consider two types of protocols. In computations
where it is easy to randomly guess and check a solution,
for example finding a satisfying assignment to a SAT
instance, provers can immediately submit their solutions
to a puzzle. This approach gives good speed, and if
all the provers guess solutions randomly, the amount
of duplicated work is minimal. In computations which
require more verification work, for example multiplying
extremely large numbers, the puzzle giver may decide
to hold a preliminary bidding round to select a single
prover. This bidding reduces the price the puzzle pay
for a correct solution because each prover expects to
get paid a fixed amount per unit work, and the bidding
process reduces the total work done among all provers.
Our present work introduces a practical, new con-
sensus protocol especially suited for outsourced com-
putation. The consensus protocol offers a mechanism
by which the network can check the correctness of a
prover’s solution with minimal overhead. If the given
solution has an error, anyone may challenge it (for a
reward), then the prover may respond to the challenge,
then the challenger may challenge back again, etc. in
such a way that verifying that the prover and challenger
follow the predefined rules of their interaction game
requires only a small amount of computational work. In
case the finite interaction game reaches its last possible
round, and up to that point no rules have been broken,
then the trivial final check is passed to an authority, for
example the set of Ethereum miners [4]. At this point, the
authority either accepts the last challenge, in which case
the original solution was wrong, or rejected, in which
case it was right.
Our consensus protocol compromises between mini-
mal communication complexity and minimal redundant
work. On one extreme, you have the Bitcoin network in
which a single announcement of a new block results in
immediate consensus among all parties as to which new
transactions are acceptable [15]. Consensus in Bitcoin,
called Nakamoto consensus [13], achieves low commu-
nication complexity in exchange for an extremely high
amount of local work from miners. In the other extreme,
Byzantine consensus [3] avoids local work, but requires a
considerable amount of message passing among parties.
Our verification game below requires nontrivial interac-
tion and some local work, but not nearly as much of
either as Byzantine or Nakamoto consensus respectively.
Perhaps consequently, it permits more robust verification
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than the purely Nakamoto-based outsourced computation
system proposed in [12].
II. THE VERIFICATION GAME
The main idea of this paper — compared to prior work
on consensus computing — is that there is an explicit
game for verifying the solution between a prover and a
challenger. The basic idea is similar to interactive proof
systems, except that both prover and challenger have
limited resources.
Nodes on the network have four types of computa-
tional Tasks:
1) solving puzzles,
2) challenging puzzle solutions,
3) checking that provers and challengers play the ver-
ification game according to the established rules,
and
4) doing proof-of-work as required for participation in
the blockchain consensus.
The presence of Task 4) implicitly assumes that we
embed our verification game system inside of a cryp-
tocurrency such as Ethereum. One need not have a
cryptocurrency system in order to make use of the
verification game protocol below, however employing
an existing cryptocurrency construction simplifies the
implementation. Task 4) encompasses Task 3) in the
following sense. Nakamoto consensus dictates that min-
ers always mine on the longest blockchain in which all
transactions are correct. Thus miners can vote for or
against the validity of a set of transactions by choosing
which fork of the blockchain to extend.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that
network nodes engage either in some combination of
Task 1) and Task 2) or in Task 4), but not a combination
of these two sets. Moreover, we identify Task 3) and
Task 4) into a single task. This disjointness of computa-
tional resources may materialize in practice since miners
use specialized hardware to achieve Task 3) whereas
Task 1) and Task 2) require general-purpose computers.
Therefore one cannot use machines for one of the sets of
Tasks on the other. We summarize our assumed network
properties as follows.
Assumption 1. In order to guarantee correctness of the
protocol, we assume the following:
(i) for each submitted puzzle solution, either:
a. at least one node on the network is able and
sufficiently non-lazy to both properly check the
full solution and raise alerts for mistakes as
needed, or
b. a fixed fraction of the nodes of the network are
able and sufficiently non-lazy to check a share
of the solution and raise alerts for mistakes as
needed, and
(ii) more than half of the nodes who verify the rules
of the verification game are ǫ-rational [12] in the
sense that they will do the verification correctly
without receiving a reward so long as their compu-
tational burden in doing so does not exceed some
small threshold ǫ.
Whether we choose Assumption (i)a or Assump-
tion (i)b above depends on the verification game con-
tracts. We discuss two possible protocols in the next sec-
tion, called consensus-competition or consensus-contract
We shall also assume that, in any verification game,
the computations of both the prover and the challenger
run in time polynomial in the size n of the input. The
puzzle giver himself, who wants the problem to be
solved, is sufficiently wealthy to pay for the computation,
but not in possession of the necessary computational
resources. The network (miners) consists of many par-
ticipants who verify that both sides in the verification
game stick to the rules and that the winner is determined
correctly; however, each single step which they verify
should be of small computational complexity.
Definition 2. In general, a (f, g, h)-verification game
consists of
(i) f(n) rounds on the block chain where
(ii) the players can write up to O[g(n)] bits of infor-
mation in every round, and
(iii) a miner in the network spends up to poly[h(n)]
time for verifying each step.
Here the time is measured for random access computa-
tion, and thus a miner need not read the full information
provided in a round but only the relevant parts needed
for verification.
Normally, one would expect f(n) to be small, say
constant or log n. The function h(n) is expected to be
around log n or poly log n, as this is the time that the
miners use for verification. The function g(n) should ide-
ally be around n (say n log n); however, in some cases,
such as in Proposition 9, g(n) may be a polynomial in
n. Note that the space g(n) used need not always occupy
a blockchain. One may put these g(n) bits on a publicly
readable board where they cannot be altered.
As the above verification game has costs, every par-
ticipant in the consensus computation has to place a
deposit. This deposit of a participant is split among the
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hurt parties in the case that the verification game shows
that the participant has been cheating, for example,
by submitting a false solution or challenging a correct
solution.
Example 3. Matrix multiplication of n×n matrices over
a fixed finite field F has a (2, n, log n)-verification game.
The prover has solution C for the product of A and
B.
In the first round, the challenger outputs coordinates
i, j such that
ci,j 6=
∑
k
ai,k · bk,j
with corresponding evidence consisting of a sequence
d0, d1, . . . , dn of elements in F with
dm =
m∑
k=1
ai,k · bk,j.
The network verifies that i, j are coordinates and that
dn 6= ci,j and that d0 = 0. The challenger loses if this
verification does not go through.
In the second round, the prover tries to defend himself
by providing a k such that dk 6= dk−1+ai,k ·bk,j in F. If
the network can verify this claim then the prover wins,
otherwise the challenger wins.
Remark 4. One can combine this idea together with
the idea to verify remainders in order to make a
(O(1), n log n, log n)-verification game which permits to
check whether the product of two n× n matrices of n-
digit numbers gives a claimed n× n matrix of 2n-digit
numbers.
In the example above, as in the subsequent examples
below, we do not specify the means by which the
challenger discovers the witness for his challenge. The
challenger might be one of the other provers who has
lower priority for receiving the reward. In this case,
he has already computed the product himself and can
therefore check the correctness of the entries in C
quickly. The puzzle giver might also also try to check the
prover’s answer himself by computing a random handful
of entries from C . If the puzzle giver finds an error, he
can proceed with a challenge. Alternatively, one could
modify the verification game for matrix multiplication so
as to have the challenges proceed according to Freivald’s
probabilistic O(n2)-time algorithm for matrix multipli-
cation verification [5], [14].
Example 5. Consider the problem of finding intersection
of two sets A and B which are a subset of some univer-
sal set U . This problem has a (2, O(log n), O(log n))-
verification game.
Assume that sets A, B, and the solution C are
represented in array form. Furthermore, it is assumed
that equality of two elements from U can be checked
fast enough by the network. The proof can be generalized
to various other representations. Suppose A and B are
the input sets. The prover gives a solution C . Let
na, nb, nc, nu be the size of the arrays for A, B, C , and
U respectively.
Round 1. The challenger challenging the solution pro-
vides a counterexample by giving either
(i) positive indices ia ≤ na and ib ≤ nb
(denoting that A(ia) = B(ib) but A(ia)
not in C), or
(ii) a positive index jc ≤ nc (denoting that
C(jc) 6∈ A ∩B).
The miners verify that indeed ia ≤ na, ib ≤ nb
and A(ia) = B(ib) in case (i) and jc ≤ nc in
case (ii). If the above test fails, then challenger
loses the game.
Round 2. To defend himself, the prover gives in case (i)
above a positive index ic ≤ nc intended to
show that A(ia) = C(ic) and in case (ii) two
positive indices ja ≤ na and jb ≤ nb intended
to witness that C(jc) = A(ja) = B(jb).
The miners verify in case (i) that
• ic ≤ nc and
• A(ia) = C(ic)
or in case (ii) that
• ja ≤ na,
• jb ≤ nb and
• C(jc) = A(ja) = B(jb).
If the above test fails then the challenger wins
the game else the prover wins the game.
Note the assumption that the comparison of the set
elements (such as A(ia) = B(ib) etc. in the protocol
above) can be done in “small time” by the network.
In case the representation of the elements is large (say
taking r bits), then we can introduce another round of
challenge/verification by prover or challenger to reduce
the time needed by the miners.
In case the prover wants to object that A(ia) = B(ib)
as provided by challenger in Round 1, he can provide
a position where A(ia) and B(ib) differ. The miners
then just verify whether the bits of A(ia) and B(ib)
at the corresponding positions are equal or not. Similar
method can be used in case challenger wants to object
that A(ja) = C(ic) or B(jb) = C(ic). Note that this
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would take additional O(log r) bits of space. Similar
comparison method can also be used for checking the
following inequalities:
ia ≤ na, ja ≤ na,
ib ≤ nb, jb ≤ nb,
ic ≤ nc, jc ≤ nc.
Example 6. Consider the problem of sorting n num-
bers A(1), A(2), . . . , A(n) each of at most r bits in
non-decreasing order. This has a (2, log(n + r), log n)-
verification game.
The prover provides a solution f(1), . . . , f(n), each
being a number of log(n) bits where this sequence is
supposed to be a sorted permutation of the given items
1, . . . , n.
Round 1. The challenger provides one of the following
challenges:
(i) a positive number j ≤ n such that
• f(j) > n or
• f(j) < 1;
(ii) two postive numbers i, j ≤ n such that
• i 6= j and
• f(i) = f(j);
(iii) positive numbers j ≤ n and b ≤ r where
the intention is that
A[f(j)] > A[f(j + 1)]
and the least bit where they differ is b-th
bit.
In case (i) or case (ii), the miners just check
whether the claim holds. If so, then challenger
wins the game. In case (iii), the miners check
whether the b-th bit in A[f(j)] is 1 and b-th
bit in A[f(j + 1)] is 0. If not, then prover
wins the game. Otherwise, the game proceeds
to Round 2.
Round 2. The prover provides a bit b′, with 1 ≤ b′ < b.
The intention is that b′ < b is the bit-position
where A[f(j)] and A[f(j + 1)] differ.
The miners then just check whether the above claims
hold, namely that the b′-th bits of A[f(j)] and A[f(j+1)]
are different. If so, then prover wins the game. Other-
wise, challenger wins the game.
Example 7. Computing the greatest common divi-
sor of two n-digit numbers has an (3, n log n, log n)-
verification game.
For the solution, the prover provides the greatest
common divisor c of input numbers a, b plus signed n-
digit integers d, d′, e, e′ such that the following equations
hold:
c = d · a+ e · b,
a = d′ · c,
b = e′ · c.
Alternatively one could view this also as a
(4, n log n, log n)-verification game, where the prover
provides d, d′, e, e′ in the initial round of verification.
Let a%p denote the remainder of a by p which is a
number in {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}, even for negative numbers.
Round 1. The challenger claims that the solution is
wrong modulo a 2 log n digit number p; if
the solution is indeed false, such a number
p exists by the Chinese Remainder Theorem
and the fact that almost all n-digit numbers
are smaller than the product of primes smaller
than n2 (which can be represented by 2 log n
digits). The challenger provides p, a%p, b%p,
c%p, d%p, d′%p, e%p, e′%p, and the network
checks that
• these numbers all have at most 2 log n
digits (plus a suitable constant to cover the
finitely many exceptions for small values
of n), and
• the equations above hold for these values
modulo p.
Round 2. The prover, to defend the solution, will select
a k ∈ {a, b, c, d, e, d′ , e′} and claim that k%p
does not have the value claimed by the chal-
lenger. To substantiate the claim, the prover
provides two lists of numbers:
• an array of n bits k0, . . . , kn which sup-
posedly is the binary representation of k,
• and array of numbers k˜0, . . . , k˜n, each
at most 2 log n bits long, which al-
legedly gives the binary representation of
k0 . . . km mod p.
The network will verify that k˜n differs from
what the challenger had claimed to be k%p,
otherwise the prover loses the game.
Round 3. The challenger selects a number m such that
either
(i) m = 0 and k˜0 6= k0, or
(ii) m > 0 and k˜m 6= (2k˜m−1 + km)%p.
This can be verified by each miner involved in
time poly log n. If the complaint is justified,
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then the challenger wins the game else the
prover wins the game.
Remark 8. One could replace the checking of the re-
mainder computation – which involves the usage of
O(n log n) space of the block chain – by an iterated
game between the two players which compare their
computations with some type of interval search for a
mistake in the computation of the remainder. This has
2 log n + O(1) rounds and would result in a (2 log n +
O(1), log n, log n)-verification game for remainder. In
this scenario, it is necessary that the solution c is
accompanied by the numbers d, d′, e, e′.
Proposition 9. Let ε be any positive rational number,
and let k and h be positive constants. If a computational
puzzle can be solved in time nk and space nh, then it
has a (O(1), nh+ε, log n)-verification game.
Proof: Without loss of generality, the model of
computation is a Turing machine. The basic idea is to
check the Turing machine configurations (instantaneous
descriptions). Either the prover or challenger’s computa-
tion sequence must be wrong. Therefore, for finding the
cheater, it is enough to find a t such that the configuration
at time t is same for both but the configurations are
different at time t+ 1, and then check which transition
is valid based on the Turing machine.
When challenging the result of the prover, the chal-
lenger wants to convince the network that the Turing
machine computation is different than the result. So
he publishes i (with i = nε) configurations spaced
out equally over the computation time nk and named
y0,1, . . . , y0,i. The prover can now challenge either that
(i) the input is wrongly encoded in y0,1 (with a pointer
to the wrongly coded symbol), or
(ii) the output encoded in y0,i is the same as the prover
provided, or
(iii) there is a j0 such that y0,j0+1 is not obtained from
y0,j0 by running the machine nh−ε steps.
For the first complaint, the network can compare the
two symbols at the two positions and decide whether the
complaint on y0 is justified. For a complaint of the third
type, the challenger can give a pointer to the position
of difference and the network can decide who is right.
For a complaint of yj0 not leading to yj0+1, the process
can now be iterated with the challenger providing a
new set y1,1, . . . , y1,i of configurations spaced out by
nk−2ε computation steps and again the prover can either
challenge the copying of y0,j0 into y1,1 by providing
a pointer to the point of difference or challenge the
copying of y0,j0+1 into y1,i by providing a pointer or
challenging the computation from y1,j1 to y1,j1+1 for
some j1. In general, for each u < k/ε, provided that
the copying is correct, the game goes from analysing the
configurations yu,1, . . . , yu,i to yu+1,1, . . . , yu+1,i where
yu+1,1 = yu,ju and yu+1,i = yu,ju+1 for some ju selected
by the prover.
In the last round, the computations are each pro-
gressing by at most one time step and the prover has
to pinpoint the positions at which the two subsequent
configurations did not conform with the rules of updating
the Turing machine configurations in one step. The
difference between the two configurations only is the
binary coding of the head positions, the state and the
content of the cell at the old head position; the network
can check whether, at the position pointed by prover,
the computation conforms with the update rules of the
Turing machine. If so, the challenger wins the game; if
not, the prover wins the game by successfully refuting
the alternative computation of the challenger. Thus the
overall number of rounds is approximately k/ε which is
a constant, as h, k, ε are constants.
Example 10. While finding a prime factorization in
polynomial time needs a quantum computer (based on
any algorithm known up to now), prime factorization
itself has a (O(1), n4+ε, log n)-verification game which
can be played by polynomial time players on both sides
of the game. So let b1 · · · bm be the proposed prime
factorization of a given n-digit number a.
Recall that by the algorithm of Agrawal, Kayal and
Saxena [1], a number bk, having up to n bits, is a prime
iff there are no numbers r, c, d satisfying one of the
following conditions:
(i) cd = bk and 1 < d ≤ 2n;
(ii) bk = c · d and 1 < c < n4 and d 6= 1;
(iii) r is the least number with
• bk, b
2
k, . . . , b
n2
k 6≡ 1 mod r,
• c <
√
r · n, and
• (x+ c)bk 6≡ xbk + c mod bk, xr − 1,
where the second modular equivalence is over a
polynomial in the formal variable x.
In the game the challenger would either claim that
b1 · · · bm is not equal to a or that some bk is not a prime.
There is a bound of O(n3) on the size of r [10] and
thus the space used by the algorithm is O(n4) which is
the space needed to represent the polynomials (x + c)u
modulo bk, xr − 1 when computing the power (x+ c)bk
modulo bk, xr − 1 fast. The existence of the verification
game now follows from Proposition 9.
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Definition 11. In an optimization problem where one is
trying to find a solution maximized on some measure,
the quality of a solution refers to the magnitude of that
measurement. Thus a high quality solution is closer to
optimal than a low quality one.
Example 12. In machine learning, given a sample
(x1, c1), . . . , (xn, cn) of data items xk to be classified
as ck by some classifier f (like a perceptron or decision
tree) whose parameters are to be learned by a learning
algorithm, one can phrase it as an optimization task. Here
each solution is given of the form (σ, k0, . . . , kn) where
σ is the set of parameters of f and km says how many
of the first m solutions are classified correctly; the value
kn is the quality of the solution. A solution is valid iff
(i) 0 = k0 ≤ · · · ≤ kn, and
(ii) km+1 = km+1 in the case that the classifier given
by σ satisfies f(xm) = cm and km+1 = km if f
satisfies f(xm) 6= cm.
The network first verifies that k0 = 0 and the remaining
verification game runs in constantly many rounds. The
first round is a challenge of the form m ∈ {0, . . . , n−1}
indicating that km+1 is wrongly updated from km. Sub-
sequent rounds then investigate whether the underlying
computation of f(xm) gives cm, so that one can check
whether the challenge to the update of km is justified.
For example, in the case of separation by a hyperplane,
σ will be the coefficients of the hyperplane and f(xm)
gives the side (0 or 1) of the hyperplane in which xm
lies in. In case of classification by decision trees, σ is
a particular decision tree. Then, f(xm) gives the value
of classification as given by the decision tree when the
input is xm.
Remark 13. Similarly, one can also formulate the factor-
ization game as an optimization task. In this case, any
solution of an n-bit number a to be factorized consists
of a list (m, b1, . . . , bk) such that
• m = k,
• 2 ≤ b1 ≤ · · · ≤ bk, and
• a = b1 · · · bk.
Any solution not obeying these rules is invalid and the
larger the m the better the solution. Note that the number
m can be written down using log(n) bits (as m ≤ n) and
one can verify solutions in LOGSPACE. Thus the game
has, for every ε > 0, a (O(1), nε, log n)-verification
game.
III. FRAMEWORKS OF CONSENSUS-COMPETITION
AND CONSENSUS-CONTRACT
These verification games can be used to put together
a framework to carry out consensus computations where
the bulk of the work is done by the task giver who wants
a task to be solved, the provers who hand in possible
solutions to be checked and the challengers who are
incentivized to check the handed-in solutions in order
to eliminate faulty ones.
We present below two verification game variants,
which we call consensus-competition (Protocol 14) and
consensus-contract (Protocol 15). While the consensus-
competition protocol has the advantage that one can
verify some puzzles more quickly and that the work
of the challenger may be reduced, however we will
focus primarily on the consensus-contract protocol for
its ease of implementation. In a consensus-competition,
challengers race to check a prover’s solution using
probabilistic or any ad-hoc methods, and the first one to
find an error wins a prize. In a consensus-contract, the
challengers collectively decide ahead of time, by bidding
or otherwise, who should check the given solution first.
When puzzles do not lend themselves to guess-and-check
error finding, consensus-contracts have the advantage
that they reduce the amount of redundant work done by
the network.
Protocol 14. The framework of a consensus-competition
is the following. For covering the network costs, it is
assumed that all participants (task-givers, provers and
challengers) provide some fees to the network for the
costs incurred by the network. These costs are constants
and are left out from the following description. The
deposits mentioned below do not include these fees.
(a) The task giver T specifies a task to be solved, an
algorithm for the verification process and the time
permitted for phases (b) and (d) listed below (where
the time of (d) might be a formula depending on the
number m of solutions), and the run time permitted
for each step in the verification game. The task giver
also specifies the amount of the prize to be awarded
for the solution and also the minimum deposit to be
paid by each prover and challenger. Additionally, for
optimization problems, the task giver may provide a
minimal quality of the solution needed to enter the
competition.
(b) The provers provide encrypted pairs (S, q, d) where
S is the solution and d the amount of deposit which
they offer, and in case of optimization problems, q
is the quality of the solution. Note that d and q must
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be above the minimum as specified in (a). Higher
amount of deposit is used to get higher priority as
mentioned below. Both numbers d, q are assumed to
have only small number of digits so that the network
working bound of the protocol is met.
(c) Each prover decrypts his solution and deposit in
a verifiable way and the network sorts the pairs
(S, q, d) – solution, quality (of optimization prob-
lems) and deposit – in an order such that higher
quality solutions are before lower quality solutions
and, for equal quality solutions, higher deposits
go before lower deposits. The network furthermore
eliminates solutions not meeting the minimum de-
posit or quality criterion. Let S1, S2, . . . , Sm be the
solutions in the above order.
(d) In the next round, each prover and each member
of the network can challenge solutions. The priority
among the challenges are again given by encrypted
deposits, where one deposit works for all challenges
by the same user. A prover is allowed to top up
its deposit on the solution in order to get a higher
priority for challenges. The network orders the chal-
lenges according to the amount of the deposit given
by them.
(e) The network maintains list of pairs of solutions
and challenges in lexicographic order (first all pairs
involving S1, then those involving S2 and so on).
In each round one processes the least pair (Si, Cj)
in the above order where neither Si nor Cj have
been disqualified so far, until the list is exhausted.
For each such pair (Si, Cj), the players Si and Cj
play the verification game and the network decides
who wins and who loses the game. The loser loses
his deposit which is split into half / half between
the winner and T ; furthermore, the loser will now
be disqualified from further games. This process
terminates when for all pairs (Si, Cj) in the list,
either the game has been decided or one of the
parties has been disqualified.
(f) If no solution survives, then T gets his prize re-
funded. If one or several solutions survive, then
the least i such that Si survives receives the prize.
Furthermore, the deposits of all surviving provers
and challengers get refunded to the party who paid
the deposit.
Protocol 15. A consensus-contract is a contract between
a task-giver T and a client S where T gets the solution of
S checked in a way similar to a consensus-competition.
S has to pay a deposit for his solution to be checked. If
within the agreed time-frame no challengers successfully
challenge the solution, then the deposit is refunded to
S together with the prize for solving the problem; the
deposits of the challengers are split between task-giver
and prover in order to compensate them for the delays
and work caused by the checking. If some challenger
successfully challenges the solution S, then the deposit
of S is split between task-giver and challenger and the
prize is recycled for the next contractor willing to take
up the task. Here each challenge is handled in the same
way as before by a verification game and challengers are
put in an order based on the deposits that they provide.
It can be easily verified that among the solutions, the
prover Si providing a correct solution wins (with i being
minimal, in case of several correct solutions), provided
that T gives enough time for provers and challengers
to compute the winning strategies for the corresponding
verification games: Each Sj with j < i will be defeated
by a sufficiently well-equipped challenger and Si will
defend its solutions successfully to all challenges. So the
task should be solved successfully provided that T gives
enough time to compute solutions, make the moves in
the verification games and provides enough incentive for
an honest and sufficiently capable player to participate in
the competition for the solution. This is essentially the
content of the following theorem. A similar result can
also be shown for optimization tasks.
Theorem 16. Assume that the following conditions hold:
• A is a task which has exactly one output for every
input;
• The task giver provides a prize money which is at
least two times the cost of computing the solution
and the network fees paid by the provers, for every
sufficiently powerful prover of the network;
• The deposit required is at least four times the
maximum of following costs:
– the network fees to be downpaid when submit-
ting a solution or challenge, and
– the expected local computation costs for a
sufficiently powerful prover or challenger to do
the computations to carry out all rounds of the
verification game;
• The task giver provides enough time for phase (b)
so that a member of the network with sufficient
computation power can solve the problem within
the specified time;
• The task giver provides enough time for phase (d)
so that a member of the network with sufficient
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computation power can compare each solution with
its own solution and, in the case that it differs,
submit a challenge;
• The task giver provides enough time for each step
in the verification game so that the provers and
challengers with sufficient computation power can
run their winning strategy for the case that their
solution or challenge, respectively, is correct.
Then, in the case that one prover with sufficient com-
putation power participates in the game, this prover is
incentivized to submit a correct solution and to win the
prize money and one such prover will eventually win the
prize money. Furthermore, the deposits motivate chal-
lengers to detect false solutions and provers to defend
correct solutions and thus deter provers and challenges
from putting up false solutions or challenges.
Proof: Note that if the provers and challengers
have enough time for the verification game, then they
can challenge any wrong solution. The costs involved
for them is the network cost paid and the cost of
computation. If they win the challenge, then they get
twice the above costs as payback (as the remaining
deposit of the loser goes to the task giver). Thus, there is
enough incentive for the challengers to challenge wrong
solutions.
If the prover S has enough time to compute a solution,
then its costs are just the network fees and the cost of
computation. If the prize money is double the above
costs, then there is enough incentive for S to enter
the contest. As mentioned above, S also has enough
time/incentive to challenge a higher priority wrong solu-
tion. Thus, either S wins, or only correct solutions with
priority higher than S survive. In either case a correct
prover wins the prize money.
Note that if the provers/challengers solve the problem
not just based on reward/deposit gained but also based
on expected chance that they win the reward in case
of presence of large number of provers, then the above
incentive structure need to be appropriately updated. For
example, if the number of expected correct solutions
posted is 5, then for a prover expected return is 1/5-
th of the reward. Thus, the reward needs to be at least 5
times the costs. However, as it is not possible to estimate
the number of provers who will attempt the problem, we
have used twice the costs as enough incentive.
Remark 17. A consensus-contract has the advantage that
contract-taker knows that the prize will be awarded to
him, provided that a correct solution is given (and thus
the verification goes through). The task-giver has the
advantage that the prize money does not need to be too
high: the provers will only try to solve if their expected
award is more than the work done — for example in
the consensus competition case, if the expected number
of correct submitted solutions is three, then each prover
knows that he gets the prize only with probability 1/3
and therefore he would only work if either the prize
money is at least three times the expected costs or if
he has the means to bypass the other correct solutions
through a higher deposit. For tasks where many users
spend a small amount of effort to solve the problem
and where solving the problem is a game of chance
– like guessing next week’s lottery numbers or, in a
computational setting, finding the solutions of some
satisfiability problem – the consensus-competition might
be the more adequate way to go. On the other hand,
where the task is deterministic and effort needed is
well defined, just large, consensus-contract is the more
adequate way to go.
Remark 18. For the choice of the parameters in a
consensus-competition, the following ideas might be
helpful as a guideline.
• The encrypted phase (b) is there to avoid the case
that some users read the solutions of the other users
and cooperate with miners in order to get their so-
lution into the blockchain with priority (timestamp)
ahead of the others. Furthermore, paying a deposit is
like having some confidence that the solution will
survive a verification game; hence solutions with
higher deposits are given priority over solutions
with lower deposit.
• Deposits might not deincentivize malicious players
on the network if they have enough money. They
might, however, compensate the persons involved
for the work they did (such as provers playing a
verification game to justify the solution, challengers
playing a game to eliminate fraudulent provers
and the task-giver suffering a delay from ongoing
fraudulent behavior of provers and challengers).
• The task giver has to select the amount of the
prize and the minimum deposits for provers and
challengers and the time given for the competi-
tion carefully. Too low minimum deposits attract
cheaters who try to get the prize unjustifiedly;
too high minimum deposits might prevent honest
provers or challengers from participating due to
the lack of funds. Too high prize money or too
long solving time might attract too many solutions,
which then makes the whole process lengthy and
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results in many verification games to be played. Too
short solving time might prevent any honest prover
from being able to submit a solution.
• Similarly the task giver has to decide about the time-
frame in which players have to move in the verifi-
cation game or other parts of the process. If players
stop to move they must get disqualified; however,
in order to avoid honest players getting disqualified
due to the time-complexity of computing the right
move, the time-out must be sufficient generous. On
the other hand, a too high time-out might slow down
the whole computation and decision process.
• Malicious players might, under various names, put
up several solutions. A player providing a correct
solution is allowed to use his single deposit to
challenge all other solutions in order to prevent
that he goes bankrupt when challenging a multitude
of malicious incorrect solutions of higher priority;
similarly a challenger who does not provide a
solution does also pay only one deposit, though he
might challenge all solutions.
• In order to avoid that the system is abused by a
player making multiple false challenges, all chal-
lenges and the solution of a player are thrown out
when he loses a verification game — honest players
are supposed to win them under all circumstances.
Thus each run of the verification game is paid by
the deposit of the loser (a prover or a challenger).
• Players might circumvent the rule that false solu-
tions or challenges throw them out of the compe-
tition by using different identities; however, then
they have to also pay multiple deposits, and thus
this does not pay off financially.
• The verification game will make the best solution
win phase (e) of the protocol for the consensus
computation provided that there is a good solution
and that its prover challenges all false solutions
which pretend to be better.
• Phase (d) allows additional challengers to enter the
game. For example, a large factorization problem
might only be solvable using quantum comput-
ers, while primality testing algorithms [1] permit
sufficiently powerful traditional supercomputers to
check for the primality of the factors of these large
numbers; hence they are allowed to enter the game.
As indicated, the verification games then use only
O(n4+ε) space on the block chain entries and this
makes it possible for T to get the factorization task
verified through the network rather than by using
its own limited resources. Furthermore, phase (d)
also allows T to challenge incorrect solutions and
avoid the situation where it is forced to award a
prize unjustifiedly.
IV. A VERIFICATION PROTOCOL WITH INCENTIVES
We assume that individuals on the network are ra-
tional, in the sense of Nash equilibrium, and wish to
exchange computational resources for financial rewards.
We want to incentivize correct computations. At a high
level, our protocol is as follows.
Protocol 19. A solution to a puzzle is presented, fol-
lowed by challenges.
Step 1. A puzzle giver G presents a puzzle.
Step 2. A prover P proposes a solution S to G’s puzzle.
Step 3. A small set of randomly selected challengers
C1,C2, . . . checks whether S is correct.
a) If there are no objections from the challengers,
then
• the network accepts S,
• P pays G for his solution, and
• each of the challengers receives a nominal
reward for participating.
b) If some Ci reports a mistake in S, then:
• Ci checks the solution S by playing the
verification game with P, and
• the loser of this verification game pays a
large penalty to the winner.
c) Next:
• In case this game continues until the last
possible round, the community V deter-
mines the winner by verifying the correct-
ness of the final response in the game.
• In case V determines that Ci made a false
alarm, after Ci pays a penalty we repeat
Step 3.
• Otherwise Ci receives her reward from for
correctly raising an alarm, and the network
rejects S.
We now give more details.
A. Step 1: Presenting the puzzle
The puzzle giver posts his puzzle in a public place.
The puzzle may be a known problem, such as checking
whether all the transactions in a Bitcoin block are valid,
or a puzzle that an individual independently wants to
solve. External to the system we describe, G must com-
mit both his puzzle and its prize to this system so that
in the end the system can either reward or penalize the
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prover for his solution. For instance, the problem and its
reward could be committed to some public blockchain.
G’s puzzle is converted into a verification game either
manually or via Proposition 9.
B. Step 2: Committing a solution
In this step, the network selects a candidate solution S
for the puzzle. The prover P commits a significant
amount of capital to an escrow which, according to some
contract, he gets back later iff his solution S turns out to
be correct. The prover wants to be sure that no one else
can steal his answer and claim a reward for his solution,
and the community wants to be sure that the prover can’t
change his solution once it has been committed.
The paper [12] describes a commitment scheme in
which a prover’s solutions might be securely broadcast
and selected using the Ethereum blockchain. First, ev-
eryone races to solve the puzzle, and then an Ethereum
blockchain lottery elects a prover from among the first
solutions to appear. The designated prover then hashes
his solution onto the blockchain, thereby committing his
answer, and once the blockchain decides that the prover
P has been elected, he then commits his solution in
plaintext to the blockchain along with a smart contract
carrying his deposit.
C. Selecting a subcommittee
Next we select a random subcommittee of challengers
to check P’s solution S. The number of challengers
selected should be large enough that at least one among
them is honest enough to check the solution S in
exchange for the potentially large reward for finding a
mistake, and the subcommittee size is not too large so as
to be prohibitively expensive. The expense here derives
from the fact that each member of the subcommittee
must be compensated financially for his computational
effort in checking, so larger subcommittees are more
expensive. The rewards for challengers should be at least
enough to compensate for checking effort in case the
solution turns out to be correct, and significantly more
in case the challenger finds an error. The “significantly”
part is needed in order to incentivize the challenger to
actually do the checking, particularly in the case where
the challenger believes that his chances of finding an
error are small.
We select the subcommittee of challengers via a
lottery. When the solution is announced, everyone who
is interested in participating in the subcommittee does a
proof-of-work. Ideally the proof-of-work puzzle should
be sequential rather than parallelizable, as defined in [8],
so that each party, regardless of computational power,
takes the same amount of time to complete the proof-of-
work task. Then everyone with a minimum amount of
computational power has a chance to win the race and
therefore gets a lottery ticket. Sequential proof-of-work
differs from the parallelizable work used in Bitcoin and
other cryptocurrencies An ideal candidate for sequential
proof-of-work has yet to appear [8], nevertheless, but we
need only imagine that everyone who can demonstrate a
minimum amount of computational power should have
a chance to be selected. Finally we randomly sample a
subset of those who successfully completed the proof-
of-work task. If the proof-of-work task had several
solutions, we could, for example, elect those members to
subcommittee whose hash of their solution ends in some
prescribed sequence of digits.
In addition to submitting a proof-of-work, each can-
didate for the subcommittee must deposit some money
into an escrow account. This money will be used to
impose a penalty in case the candidate is selected for
the subcommittee and subsequently raises a false alarm
(or an incorrect check). We omit precise details of the
subcommittee construction as we anticipate embedding
this game inside of another forthcoming system which
can securely appoint the subcommittee [2], [6].
D. Playing the verification game
Each challenger privately checks the solution S. The
checking round ends as soon as one of the following
things happens:
• some challenger Ci announces a mistake in S, or
• the predetermined time limit for challenging has
been reached.
Due to the non-laziness assumption, at least one chal-
lenger will respond within the given time limit. In
the latter case, each Cj gets paid for verification in
proportion to the gas limit, or predetermined CPU cycles,
for the problem. If, on the other hand, some challenger
Ci announces a mistake in Ci, then Ci and P play a
verification game. In this case, Ci will either receive
a substantial reward for detecting a mistake or face a
substantial penalty for raising a false alarm.
The community vote V only gets invoked if the final
round of the verification game occurs. Hence if the
challengers agree that P’s solution is correct or if Ci
and P can settle their verification game amicably, then
the community need not do any work. In this way we
minimize the computational burden on the community
which, as in Bitcoin, we expect does a small amount of
verification work for free.
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E. Correctness and efficiency
We assume that challengers in the network are ratio-
nal, and that there are sufficiently many of them that are
non-lazy so that at least one non-lazy challenger belongs
to each randomly selected subcommittee, thereby satis-
fying Assumption 1-(i)a and Assumption 1-(ii). In Sec-
tion III, we discussed two flavors of verification games
based on either consensus-competition or consensus-
contract protocols. Consensus-competitions cost less be-
cause the challengers only sample the output and do not
necessarily check the whole thing. Consensus-contracts,
on the other hand, cost more because challengers are
expected to replicate the prover’s entire work. For sim-
plicity, we will discuss only consensus-contracts here.
In general, challengers have incentive to be both non-
lazy and verify honestly in this protocol because they
gain large prizes for discovering errors, and they are
discouraged from reporting errors falsely by monetary
penalties.
For example, suppose that the challenger is supposed
to check whether a matrix multiplication is correct,
and suppose that a consensus-competition compensates
challengers for the expected work required to find an
error assuming 10% of the entries are wrong, and that
the prize for finding an error during this check is 50
times more than the compensation for checking. If the
challenger believes that the actual chances of finding a
mistake in the prover’s solution are only 1/5000, then the
rational challenger views this 50× prize as inadequate
and therefore lacks incentive to do the check. This
discrepancy between the challenger’s belief regarding
the probability of finding an error and his actual prob-
ability of finding an error exists whether we employ a
consensus-contract or a consensus-competition.
The difference between these methods is that in a
consensus-competition, the challenger might honestly do
his verification, find no mistakes in his samples, and yet
not receive a reward because the overall submitted solu-
tion is actually incorrect. This outcome unfairly penalizes
the challenger, and so a rational challenger might not
accept such a contract in the first place. Whether or not
a challenger will accept such a contract for matrix multi-
plication depends on what the challenger believes is the
true probability of finding an error. Since the challenger
does not a priori know how likely an anonymous prover
is to make an error, no rational argument can say whether
or not the challenger should agree to the consensus-
competition. In contrast, a rational challenger should
accept an adequately compensated consensus-contract,
and if the reward for finding a bug suffices to convince
the challenger to be non-lazy, then the challenger will
do the intended work and give the correct answer. We
incentivize all of the challengers on the subcommittee to
respond by only paying compensation once sufficiently
many challengers have responded.
It is not unreasonable to expect that the community
will do a negligible about of work for free. We see
this commonly today in various distributed systems. The
challengers on the network may function also as verifiers.
V. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Outsourced computation
Mobile, scientific, and other various big data applica-
tions often require local machines to outsource computa-
tions to an external cloud computer. How can one be sure
that the computation done by a cloud is correct given
only limited local resources? Computations can contain
errors due to hardware failures, software errors, or even
laziness to expend resources on the part of the cloud. The
past five years have witnessed a rising interest in secure,
outsourced computation protocols in which the cloud
service provides, in addition to the computation itself,
some certificate of the computation’s correctness which
is easy for the client to verify [17]. Ideally, time required
to verify the computation should be small compared
to the time required to simply execute the computation
directly, while the cloud’s extra overhead in producing
the certificate should be minimal. The techniques applied
thus far involve PCP-type encodings and SNARK-like
cryptographic protocols.
One can use the protocol in Section IV to outsource
computation. The puzzle giver G puts forth the problem
and then some prover P puts forth a solution. The eco-
nomics of the verification system ensure that G receives a
correct answer. In Walfish and Blumberg’s survey article
“Verifying Computations without Reexecuting Them”
[17], the authors argue against replicating computations
as a means to achieving secure computation. Potential
solutions to this problem, they say, suffer from either
systemic errors which appear in repetitions across cloud
platforms, wrongly assume that auditors can detect rare
errors, or rely on assuming that a particular piece of hard-
ware will execute correctly. Since anyone can participate
in the verification network, we make no assumptions
about how a particular cloud sets up its hardware, and
we employ powerful economic forces to not only detect,
but reduce, errors.
Our present system offers some advantages over the
PCP/SNARK outsourced verification systems to date.
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Firstly, it doesn’t use PCPs or SNARKS. Our protocol
is simple in the sense that we do not require any com-
plicated encoding schemes or cryptographic protocols.
Secondly, our protocol can be used to correctly compute
any polynomial-time functions, whereas the PCP-style
systems proposed thus far generally operate effectively
on smaller classes of functions [17]. Finally, as we argue
below, our system has low computational overheads to
the point of being practical.
Our system has negligible setup cost. In contrast,
many of the proof-based systems to-date, including
Zaatar, Pinocchio, Ginger, and TinyRAM, require one
to run thousands of instances of a single function be-
fore breaking even on the overall verification time on
a 128 × 128 matrix multiplication puzzle [17]. Some
systems, only run on restricted circuits or try to amortize
setup costs. CMT, Allspice, and Thaler effectively slash
verification time with negligible overhead costs. The
prover overhead for Thaler in particular, under matrix
multiplication, has the same order of magnitude worker
overhead as the procotol we have presented here.
In many practical cases, a user might wish to reuse
input, rather than reuse a function, in order to execute
several analyses on the same data. In such cases, proof-
based systems with overhead generally become impracti-
cal on the verification side. Our incentive-based system,
however handles data-analysis cases well as there is no
overhead in switching between functions.
In general, the prover side of these proof-based sys-
tems is the bottleneck which prevents them from being
practical. With the exception of Thaler, all of the systems
benchmarked in [17] require a factor of 105 worker
overhead for the prover when performing a 128 × 128
matrix multiplication. Thus the cloud processing power
being used should be significantly more than 100, 000
times the verifier could do on his own hardware in order
for outsourcing to make any sense. Matrix multiplication,
in our protocol, can be done with a 3-round verification
game plus the verification time from the community (see
Example 3). So if we assume that the communication
time for posting the problem and electing a prover to
give a solution takes no more time than solving the
problem itself, we can conclude that the prover overhead
for matrix multiplication, in terms of both computational
time and effort, is generously at most a factor of 5. This
is much cheaper than the above systems in terms of
computation and hence in terms of dollars as well. In
general, an arbitrary polynomial-time function can be
done with log n overhead (Proposition 9).
B. Outsourced verification
Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin maintain a public ledger,
called a blockchain, which includes all transactions that
take place over the network. Miners on the network
are responsible for maintaining the integrity of these
transactions through two steps:
1) they select which transactions to include in the
blockchain, and
2) they verify that blockchain transactions are valid.
As the Verifier’s Dilemma in [12] illustrates, miners do
not always verify transactions correctly. We can use our
protocol in Section IV as a means to allow miners to
offload their verification burden, thereby relieving them
of the second task. Here each miner plays the role of
the Puzzle Giver in Protocol 19 who provides a block of
transactions to be verified, along with a financial contract
which guarantees funding for the network to perform
the verification. The source of these funds may come
either from the miners themselves, or in the case of
resource-heavy transactions, from the party who posts
the transactions. The system now places a
√
or a × next
to each transaction (or block of transactions) depending
on whether it is correct or incorrect.
Since miners can rely on the
√
and × marks for
correctness, they do not need to verify these transactions
themselves. Therefore this verification protocol reduces
the amount of redundant work done on the cryptocur-
rency. Only a few challengers in Protocol 19 check
each block, hence the total amount of work spent in
verification across both the cryptocurrency and verifi-
cation network is less than what would be spent if each
miner on the cryptocurrency verified each transaction for
himself. In this way, a verification network can offer
positive ecological impact.
VI. CONCLUSION
By restricting Ethereum to transactions which require
little verification time, we achieve a consensus com-
puter which achieves correct outsourced computation
results for feasible functions when the network’s com-
putational entities are rational. The verification game
described herein permits us to verify, through financial
incentives, interaction, and Nakamoto consensus, any
polynomial-time puzzle with only poly log effort. We
show how to embed this game into real systems and
argue that the computational overhead of the implemen-
tation is less than the overhead for state-of-the-art for
probabilistically-checkable-proof systems.
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